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Lilly v. Commonwealth
499 S.E.2d 522 (Va. 1998)
I. Facts
The defendant, Benjamin Lee Lilly ("Lilly"), brought this direct appeal chal-
lenging his capital murder conviction and sentence of death for the murder of
Alexander V. DeFilippis ("DeFilippis").' The Supreme Court of Virginia recited
the evidence presented at trial in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth.
The court relied on facts derived mainly from testimony of Gary Wayne Barker
("Barker"), a participant in the criminal activity leading up to and following the
murder, and an out-of-court statement made by the defendant's brother, Mark
Lilly.2 Mark Lilly's statement admitted his role as an accomplice but identified
Benjamin Lilly as the triggerman. The trial court admitted this statement as an
exception to the rule against hearsay and rejected a claim that the statement
violated the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.
3
On December 4, 1995, Lilly, Barker and Mark Lilly were drinking and
smoking marijuana at Lilly's house. The threesome decided to go to a friend's
house. Finding no one at their friend's home, the three men broke into the house
and stole a safe, liquor and several guns. After opening the safe and dividing its
contents, they drove to Radford and unsuccessfully attempted to trade the stolen
guns for marijuana. They then drove to Blacksburg to spend the night at an
acquaintance's house, all the while continuing to drink and smoke marijuana.4
On the following day the three men awoke and left Blacksburg, driving on
the back roads near Shawsville and Elliston. Traveling back to Blacksburg, they
again attempted to trade the stolen guns for marijuana. Later, driving in the
vicinity of Heathwood, their car broke down close to a convenience store. After
removing the liquor and guns from the car, they approached the convenience
store. Once at the store, Lilly approached DeFilippis as DeFilippis inspected a
tire on his car. Carrying one of the guns, Lilly ordered DeFilippis into the car
and called for Mark Lilly and Barker to join him. Lilly drove the car away from
the convenience store and took DeFilippis's wallet.5
1. Liflyv. Commonwealth, 499 S.E.2d 522,529-537 (Va. 1998), cer.grantedLiyv. Virginia,
No. 98-5881, 1998 WL 596783 (U.S. Nov. 9, 1998).
2. Li/4, 499 S.E.2d at 528.
3. Id at 534. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The United States Supreme Court has granted
certiorari to hear Lilly's Sixth Amendment daim. Lilly v. Virginia, No. 98-5881, 1998 WL 596783
(U.S. Nov. 9, 1998).
4. Id at 528.
5. Id
CAPITAL DEFENSE JOURNAL
Lilly drove to a deserted area on the New River near Whitethorne and
ordered DeFilippis out of the car. Mark Lilly, carrying one of the stolen hand-
guns, and Barker joined Lilly and DeFilippis. Lilly ordered DeFilippis to strip to
his underwear and walk away from the car. The three men threw DeFilippis's
clothes in the river and returned to the car. Lilly then allegedly took the handgun
from Mark Lilly, ran up to DeFilippis and shot him four times. Three of the four
shots hit DeFilippis in the head, causing his death.'
Leaving the body untouched, Lilly returned to the car amid questions from
the other two men as to the purpose of the killing. Stating his unwillingness to
return to prison, Lilly said that he killed DeFilippis because DeFilippis could
identify him. The three men then bought beer with DeFilippis's money and
drove to the McCoy River to dispose of evidence linking them to the murder.'
From the McCoy River, they drove to a little store in Giles County, robbing the
store of money and merchandise.8
Determining that they would need more money if they were going to be "on
the run," they headed to another store where Barker and Mark Lilly entered the
store for the purpose of robbing it. The owner broke up the robbery, and the
two fled with Lilly as the owner pursued. The owner of the store ended his
pursuit when Barker fired one of the guns into the air. Soon after the robbery
attempt the car broke down and, as they removed the stolen goods from the
vehicle, police officers arrived, quickly apprehending Lilly and Barker.'
Lilly was indicted for the murder of DeFilippis on April 1, 1996.'° Follow-
ing numerous pre-trial motions and discovery requests, jury selection began on
October 15, 1996, lasting four days.' The trial commenced on October 21 and
concluded with a guilty verdict on all counts. 2 The penalty phase commenced
on October 28 and the jury returned a recommendation of the death sentence.
The trial court imposed the death sentence by final order on March 7, 1997.13
11. Holding
The Supreme Court ofVirginia found no error below and, after performing
its perfunctory proportionality review, upheld the conviction and sentence. 4
6. Ljil, 499 S.E.2d at 528.
7. Id Nonetheless, the three retained the murder weapon in addition to the other stolen
guns.
8. Id
9. Id at 528-29.
10. Lil, 499 S.E.2d at 527.
11. Id at 527-28.
12. Id at 528. Lilly was charged with abduction, robbery, car-jacking, murder in the commis-
sion of a robbery, use of a firearm in the commission of the murder, and possession of a firearm
after previously being convicted of a felony.
13. Id
14. 1114, 499 S.E.2d. at 537-38.
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III. Analysis/Application in Virginia
Commendably, Lilly raised numerous claims on appeal, preserving many for
later federal review. Some of the claims were rejected summarily by the court on
the basis of its previous decisions." The court's resolution of other claims
involved well-settled law, or turned on facts peculiar to this case, or provided
little guidance or explanation of use to counsel in the future. 6 Consequently, only
two important claims will be analyzed in this summary.
A. Federal Confrontation Clause
The admission of Mark Lilly's hearsay statement identifying his brother as
the shooter is the issue upon which the United States Supreme Court has granted
certiorari.'7 Lilly asserted that the admission into evidence of his brother's
statement violated his right to confrontation since the declarant was not present
in court for cross-examination. 8 The court held that a defendant's right to
confront a witness at trial is not absolute and that Mark Lilly's statement was
"sufficiently clothed with indicia of reliability [to be]. . . placed before a jury."'19
The Supreme Court of Virginia correctly recited the general proposition of law
that when a state hearsay exception falls within the realm of a firmly-rooted
15. Id at 529. The court rejected the following claims based on its prior precedent: failure
of the trial court to order the Commonwealth to provide a bill of particulars (in general and with
regard to the aggravating factors which the Commonwealth planned to rely on at the penalty phase)
and the unconstitutionality of the Virginia death penalty statute.
16. Id at 529-537. These claims included: denial of counsel's request to ask questions directly
of the venire during voir dire; denial of daims that under Simmons v. South Caroina, 512 U.S. 154
(1994), prospective jurors could be educated on a convicted capital murderer's ineligibility for parole
if sentenced to life in prison; the trial court's refusal to grant a penalty phase instruction directing
the jury to consider "residual doubt" of guilt in considering the sentence. Id at 529, 537.
The court also denied Lilly's claims relating to change of venue, objecting to the presentation
of a videotape of the crime scene, objecting to the audio presentation of Mark Lilly's tape recorded
statement instead of a reading of the transcript, and objecting to a statement made by Chief
Whitsett prior to the Chief's notice to Lilly of the right against self-incrimination and the right to
counsel. Id at 531-535.
The court further held that the trial court did not commit error in denying defense counsel's
objection to the use of prejudicial graphic photos; objection to admission of evidence of Lilly's
refusal to submit to a gunpowder test; objection to admission of an unidentified bloodstain. Id at
532, 535.
The court also reviewed and dismissed the following daims: the admission of a medical
examiner's report containing hearsay material; the refusal to admit a statement of co-defendant
Barker; the refusal to strike Barker's testimony when he violated a court order prohibiting him to
read about the case; the refusal of defendant's jury instruction on voluntary intoxication and
premeditation; the refusal to grant a mistrial after prosecutorial misconduct and court disparage-
ment of defense counsel. Id at 536-37.
The court also performed its boilerplate proportionality review pursuant to Sections 17-
110.1(C)(1) and (2) of the Virginia Code and declined to reduce the sentence. Id at 537.
17. Lilly v. Virginia, No. 98-5881, 1998 WL 596783 (U.S. Nov. 9, 1998).
18. 1.Abl, 499 S.E.2d. at 534.
19. Id
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federal exception to the hearsay rule, admission of the hearsay evidence without
providing the opponent the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant will not
violate the Sixth Amendment.2' The Supreme Court of Virginia further held that
the admitted statement was a declaration against the penal interests of the declar-
ant, Mark Lilly, fulfilling a well-established hearsay exception on both the state
and federal level 2 '
It is at this point the court erred. The court's holding might be valid in a
non-capital trial, but in this capital case proper analysis should have continued,
exploring the true nature of Mark Lilly's statement. In the context of a Virginia
capital murder case, Mark Lilly's statement was not a declaration against his penal
interests, but in fact a self-serving statement. Section 18.2-18 of the Virginia
Code provides that only the trigger man may receive a capital murder conviction
and sentence of death.' The code states "an accessory before the fact or princi-
pal in the second degree to a capital murder shall be indicted, tried, convicted and
punished as though the offense were murder in the first degree."'  If Ben Lilly
was the trigger man, then Mark, as an accessory, could not be convicted of capital
murder, much less be eligible for a sentence of death. Although the statement
was a declaration against his penal interest in the most general sense, Mark's
insulation of himself from the ultimate penalty, or even from mandatory life
without parole, could hardly be more self-serving in reality. In relation to the
most important aspect of this crime, the death penalty, Mark Lilly's statement
lacked the required indicia of reliability.
The United States Supreme Court held in Williamson v. United States,24 relying
on Rule 804(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Evidence,' that a non-self-inculpatory
statement, even when made within a broader, generally self-inculpatory narrative,
is not admissible under hearsay exceptions.26 The Court continued by cautioning
the lower courts that such statements required special consideration when the
statement implicated someone else, drawing attention to the case of co-defen-
dant's statements due to a defendant's strong motivation to implicate others
while exonerating himself.2 7 In Williamson, the petitioner also claimed a violation
of the Confrontation Clause' due to his inability to cross the co-defendant when
the trial court admitted co-defendant's statement into evidence. 9 The Court
20. Id (citing White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 356 (1992)).
21. Id
22. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2- 8 (Michie Supp. 1998).
23. Id
24. 512 U.S. 594 (1994).
25. Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3).
26. Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 600-01 (1994).
27. Id at 601.
28. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Confrontation Clause reads "[i]n all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the ight... to be confronted with the witnesses against him." Id
29. Wilamson, 512 U.S. at 605.
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decided the Williamson case based on Rule 804(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, choosing not to make a constitutional holding. But the court did state
that "the very fact that a statement is genuinely self-inculpatory... is itself one
of the 'particularized guarantees of trustworthiness' that makes a statement
admissible under the Confrontation Clause." 30  Thus, the Court employed
familiar rules of appellate decision making, basing its ruling on non-constitutional
grounds where possible. There is little doubt, however, that Williamson would
also have prevailed on Sixth Amendment grounds.
The admissibility of co-defendant's statements often arises in Virginia capi-
tal murder cases with multiple defendants, in large part due to Virginia's trigger
man statute." Virginia Capital Case Clearinghouse will be happy to provide
counsel confronted with this issue with the brief from this case, examples of
motions filed in connection with this claim and any further assistance desired.
It is far from certain, of course, but Lilly's Confrontation Clause claim should
prevail in the United States Supreme Court.
B. Simmons v. South Carolina32 and Jury Awareness of Parole Ine'gibilty
Lilly sought, by pretrial motion, to inform prospective jurors concerning
Lilly's ineligibility for parole if convicted of capital murder and sentenced to life
in prison rather than death.33 Lilly relied on Simmons v. South Carolina's holding
that defendants are entitled to inform jurors of this fact.3 The Supreme Court
of Virginia found no error in the trial court's denial of the motion. In denying
the motion, the trial court held that the proper point for the presentation of such
information was the penalty phase of the trial."
Counsel's efforts are to be commended, but there may be a better way to
frame this matter. In a case where meaningful voir dire is actually permitted
pursuant to VA. CODE § 8.01-358,36 the question of juror qualifications arises
30. Id
31. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-18 (Michie Supp. 1998).
32. 512 U.S. 154 (1994).
33. Lilly's motion used the unfortunate term "educate," which is not recommended. What
Lilly sought to discuss is a legitimate matter touching the qualifications of a prospective capital juror.
34. Lilly v. Commonwealth, 499 S.E.2d. 522, 529 (Va. 1998) (citing Simmons v. South
Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 162 (1994)).
35. Id
36. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-358 (Michie 1992). Section 8.01-358 states:
[tihe court and counsel for either party shall have the right to examine under oath any
person who is called as a juror therein and shall have the right to ask such person or
juror directly any relevant question to ascertain whether he is related to either party, or
has any interest in the cause, or has expressed or formed any opinion, or is sensible of
any bias or prejudice therein; and the party objecting to any juror may introduce any
competent evidence in support of the objection; and if it shall appear to the court that
the juror does not stand indifferent in the cause, another shall be drawn or called and
placed in his stead for the trial of that case.
1998]
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under Wainwight v. Witt," Morgan v. IlInois,38 and Ross v. Oklahoma.39 These cases,
in short, require jurors to consider evidence in mitigation and not to hold pro-
death penalty views so strongly that their ability to follow the law would be
substantially impaired. Defendant's parole ineligibility is relevant to both aspects
of that qualification inquiry. No pre-trial motion should be necessary. The court
should allow defense counsel to ask prospective jurors questions regarding this
issue.
Matthew Mahoney
469 U.S. 412 (1985).
504 U.S. 719 (1992).
487 U.S. 81 (1988).
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